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WE THE UNCONVENTIONAL AMERICAN PEOPLE
We the People: Transformations. Bruce Ackerman. Harvard, 1998. Pp vii, 515.
INTRODUCTION: UNCONVENTIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION
In his 1991 volume, We the People: Foundations, Bruce Ackerman urged us as Americans to declare our independence from

European models of government and to “look inward” to rediscover our distinctive constitutional scheme--dualist democracy. 1
In his new volume, We the People: Transformations, he exhorts us as dualist democrats to break up the monopoly that
Article V of the Constitution has held on our vision of constitutional amendment. He urges us to move “beyond Article
V” and to embrace a pluralist understanding of the sources of higher lawmaking (pp 15-17). Only by doing so, he argues,
will we be able to comprehend the processes of unconventional adaptation outside Article V whereby We the People have
transformed the Constitution through the Founding, Reconstruction, and New Deal. Nothing less, Ackerman admonishes us,
will preserve and realize both “the possibility of popular sovereignty” (p 119) and “the possibility of interpretation” under
our Constitution. 2 Thus, if Foundations celebrated American exceptionalism from Europe--“We the exceptional American

People” 3 --Transformations extols our unconventional adaptation and transformation of the Constitution outside Article V--“We
the unconventional American People.”
*1514 In the introduction to Transformations, Ackerman writes: “There is lots of history in this book, some political science, a
little philosophy--but these interdisciplinary excursions are in the service of a fundamentally legal enterprise: . . . If Americans of
the 1990's wish to revise their Constitution, what are the legal alternatives they may legitimately pursue?” (p 28). His formulation
is telling, because the strengths of this magnificent and important volume lie in its history, which is ingenious and fascinating,
and its political science, which is sophisticated and insightful, but the shortcomings lie in its philosophy: its political, legal,
and constitutional theory. As a matter of history and political science, Ackerman provides among the best analyses ever offered
of the processes of constitutional transformation through the Founding and Reconstruction, and the best analogies ever drawn
between those constitutional moments of higher lawmaking and the political transformation inaugurated by the New Deal. But
as a matter of philosophy, he fails to sustain his argument that the model of transformation that he develops provides legal
alternatives for legitimate amendment of the Constitution outside Article V. The “humanistic positivism” that he adumbrates to
provide rules of recognition of higher lawmaking (as distinguished from ordinary lawmaking) (p 92) is not sufficient to establish
that the New Deal, by analogy to the Founding and Reconstruction, rises to the level of a constitutional amendment.
After describing Transformations' theory of unconventional constitutional change, I critique it in light of Ackerman's larger
project in the projected three volume We the People, focusing on three of his pervasive claims or themes. First, despite
Ackerman's claim that his theory of dualist democracy entails his account of transformation through unconventional adaptation,
he elaborates that account in a manner that practically levels or reduces his dualism to a form of monism. Second,
notwithstanding his suggestion that “the possibility of popular sovereignty” under our Constitution depends upon our accepting
his theory of transformation to supplement or even override Article V's formal amending procedures, he has not developed a
theory of popular sovereignty that is adequate to underwrite his theory of transformation, much less the Constitution. Nor has
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he shown the impossibility of a dualist constitutional theory that both gives due regard to popular sovereignty and views Article
V as specifying the exclusive procedures for amending the Constitution. Third, despite Ackerman's claim that to preserve “the
possibility of interpretation” of the Constitution we must accept his contention that the New Deal amended the Constitution, he
has not put forward *1515 a theory of interpretation that can plausibly and elegantly justify our basic liberties and many of the
leading cases since 1937 in terms of the New Deal republic. Moreover, his development of the model of transformation, which
emphasizes the discontinuity between the republics constituted by the Founding, Reconstruction, and New Deal, may make
it more difficult for him to provide interpretations that achieve “intergenerational synthesis” across republics in the projected
third volume, We the People: Interpretations. 4

Finally, in a concluding Section entitled “The Constitution Goes to Yale,” 5 I reflect upon Ackerman's claims regarding “the
possibility of popular sovereignty” and “the possibility of interpretation.” I basically turn those claims on their heads by
asking: How is it possible that Ackerman, who is Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale and is undoubtedly
in the pantheon of constitutional theorists, could believe it necessary to develop his theory of constitutional amendment and
transformation outside Article V in order to preserve and realize these possibilities? My speculation is that it must be because
of something they put in the drinking water in New Haven. 6 I suggest that the root difficulties in Ackerman's constitutional

theory bear deep affinities to those in the work of his former Yale colleague, Alexander M. Bickel 7 (as well as those in the work

of his current Yale colleague, Akhil Reed Amar 8 ). Bickel was haunted by the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” that he thought
judicial review posed in a democracy because he held an impoverished conception of our constitutional scheme as majoritarian
representative democracy. Similarly, Ackerman is hobbled by the quest for “the possibility of popular sovereignty” because he
holds a richer, yet still reductive, conception of our constitutional scheme as popular sovereignty.
*1516 As against the Yale school theorists, I contend that our Constitution is “incorrigible” 9 or “irreducible” 10 in the sense
that it resists being reduced to either majoritarianism or popular sovereignty. To do justice to our Constitution, we need a dualist
constitutional theory that conceives it as securing the basic liberties that are preconditions for self-government in two senses:
not only deliberative democracy, whereby citizens apply their capacity for a conception of justice to deliberating about the
justice of basic institutions and social policies, as well as about the common good, but also deliberative autonomy, whereby
citizens apply their capacity for a conception of the good to deliberating about and deciding how to live their own lives. 11 Such
a theory, unlike Ackerman's, would not transform our Constitution into the mold of popular sovereignty.
I. Transformations of the Constitution Through Unconventional Higher Lawmaking
A. The Story Thus Far: Foundations
In Foundations, Ackerman mapped the terrain of American constitutional theory as being divided into monists (“Anglophiles”),

rights foundationalists (“Germanophiles”), and dualists (red-blooded Americans). 12 Monism emphasizes popular sovereignty
over and against fundamental rights, and thus tends to equate popular sovereignty with parliamentary supremacy on a
British model. Rights foundationalism challenges the primacy of popular sovereignty, stressing constraints imposed by deeper
commitments to fundamental rights on a German model. Ackerman presents dualism as an “accommodation” between monism
and rights foundationalism. Dualism distinguishes between the constituent power of We the People, expressed in the higher law
of the Constitution, and the ordinary power of officers of government, expressed in the ordinary law of legislation. Dualism
preserves, against encroachment by ordinary law, the fundamental rights ordained and established by We the People in the
higher *1517 law of the Constitution; to that extent, it is like rights foundationalism. But it preserves only those fundamental
rights; beyond them, it is like monism in deferring to ordinary law.
Ackerman argued that our dualist democracy has undergone three great constitutional “moments” of higher lawmaking: the

Founding, Reconstruction, and New Deal. 13 These moments inaugurated three regimes or republics within our Constitution:
the early republic of the Founding Federalists, the middle republic of the Reconstruction Republicans, and the modern republic
of the New Deal Democrats. Ackerman sketched the processes of transformation through each moment and the substance of
the higher law of the Constitution during each republic. He argued that, in a dualist democracy, judicial review is justified on
the ground that (and to the extent that) it preserves the higher law of the Constitution against encroachment by the ordinary law
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of legislation. 14 Finally, in justifying dualist democracy, he analyzed its foundations in a political theory, grounded in popular
sovereignty, that is a synthesis of the competing traditions of liberalism and republicanism. 15
B. The Transformation of Dualist Democracy: Transformations
In Transformations, Ackerman elaborates upon the processes of transformation through the Founding, Reconstruction, and New
Deal. He does not further develop the substance of the higher law of each republic; that presumably will follow in Interpretations.
He begins by reframing the Founding (pp 32-68). He emphasizes that the Founding was a break with legality in the sense that
it did not play by the rules of the system of higher lawmaking and amendment prescribed in the Articles of Confederation.
The Continental Congress had authorized a constitutional convention to amend the Articles, not to draft a new Constitution,
and the Articles had required that amendments be adopted by every state, whereas under the proposed new Constitution,
adoption by nine states out of thirteen was sufficient for ratification. He conceives the Founding in terms of processes of
unconventional adaptation whereby the Federalists used existing institutions in new ways to earn the authority to speak for
the People, distinguishing five stages of unconventional activity: signaling, proposing, triggering, ratifying, and consolidating.
He argues that this model of transformation, not compliance with prescribed *1518 rules for amendment, accounts for the
legitimacy of the constitutional change brought about through the Founding.
Ackerman then applies the precedent of the Founding to examine Reconstruction (pp 99-252). He argues that, in adopting
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, Reconstruction also broke with legality by not following the rules
of the system of higher lawmaking and amendment specified in Article V. For example, Congress overrode southern states'
rejections of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, and conditioned each state's representation in Congress upon: (1) its adoption
of that amendment, and (2) adoption of the amendment by the three-fourths of the states required for it to become a part of
the Constitution. Again, Ackerman uses the five-stage model of transformation to illuminate the processes of unconventional
adaptation whereby Reconstruction Republicans earned the authority to transform the Constitution in the name of the People.
Finally, in rethinking the New Deal, Ackerman argues that it, by analogy to the Founding and Reconstruction, rises to the level
of a constitutional amendment and transformation (pp 279-311). He acknowledges that the New Deal did not satisfy the formal
rules for amending the Constitution specified in Article V, but for him that fact is no more dispositive than is the fact that the
Founding Federalists and Reconstruction Republicans did not play by the rules. On his view, the Founding and Reconstruction
brought about legitimate constitutional change because they satisfied the criteria for revision developed in his five-stage model of
transformation; for the same reason, so, too, did the New Deal. Ackerman concedes that, however unconventional the Founding
and Reconstruction were when measured against the prescribed rules for higher lawmaking, both of those transformations did
culminate in amendments to the text of the higher law. The New Deal, however, was unconventional not only in its processes
but also in its outcome. It did not result in any amendments to the text of the Constitution, and so to gather the content of the
New Deal transformation we must look to “transformative judicial opinions” (pp 26, 359-77). These opinions provide a textanalogue or the functional equivalent of a formal constitutional amendment. They established the constitutional permissibility
of activist government in the regulatory and welfare state.
If the foils for dualism in Foundations were monism and rights foundationalism, the foil for unconventional adaptation in
Transformations is Article V formalism or positivism: the view that Article V prescribes the exclusive procedures for amending
the Constitution (pp 15-17, 28-31). As against Article V positivists, *1519 Ackerman adumbrates a “humanistic positivism,”
which entails a pluralistic conception of the procedures for and sources of higher lawmaking (p 92). On his view, the “rules
of recognition” for higher lawmaking, or criteria for legitimate constitutional revision, are not limited to the formal rules
prescribed in Article V, but include the criteria elaborated in his five-stage model of transformation. And the sources of higher
lawmaking include not only the rules of Article V but also our principles, practices, and precedents (most importantly, the great
precedents of higher lawmaking, the Founding and Reconstruction); in effect, he proposes a common law of higher lawmaking
(pp 232, 383-84). And so, as against Article V formalism, which presumes that Article V channels all legitimate constitutional
amendment through its rules, Ackerman advances an understanding of unconventional adaptation and transformation according
to which legitimate constitutional amendment occurs outside Article V.
Ackerman argues that Article V positivists cannot account for the legitimacy of the constitutional change brought about through
either the Founding or Reconstruction, because neither played by the formal rules laid down for amending the higher law. Only
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his model of transformation can do so. He also argues that Article V positivists cannot plausibly account for the legitimacy
of the constitutional change during the New Deal. Having gained a foothold for his model of transformation in justifying the
Founding and Reconstruction, he argues that it is also necessary to account for the New Deal. He contends that the same criteria
for revision that establish the Founding and Reconstruction as constitutional transformations also establish the New Deal as one.
Article V positivists, Ackerman contends, do not merely deny that the New Deal brought about a constitutional amendment and
transformation. Worse yet, they cloak its constitutional creativity in the “myth of rediscovery”--the myth that the Supreme Court
in 1937 and afterward rediscovered the original understanding of the Constitution as contemplated by Founding Federalists,
most notably James Madison and John Marshall (pp 8-10, 259, 279). This myth of rediscovery is troublesome not only because
it obscures the foundations of the modern activist regulatory and welfare state inaugurated by the New Deal, but also because
it denigrates the constitutional creativity of We the People, thus undermining the possibility of popular sovereignty in America.
As against this view, Ackerman exhorts us to rediscover or reclaim the Constitution and to preserve the possibility of *1520
popular sovereignty through unconventional adaptation and transformation (pp 383-420). 16
II. The Transformation, and Leveling, of Dualism
As described above, Ackerman argued in Foundations that dualism offers a better account of our constitutional scheme than
monism or rights foundationalism. Nonetheless, in the closing pages of that volume he called for moving “beyond dualism” to
a rights foundationalist scheme that would entrench inalienable rights into our Constitution against subsequent amendment, 17

prompting some critics to wonder whether he was really a rights foundationalist. 18 I shall take the opposite tack in criticizing
Transformations, suggesting instead that Ackerman's theory of transformation itself transforms his theory of dualist democracy
into a form of monism.
A. Reclaiming or Reconstructing the Classical, Interpretive Justification of Judicial Review
Constitutional theorists since Bickel--and Ackerman is no exception--have been troubled by the “counter-majoritarian

difficulty” said to be posed by judicial review in a democracy. 19 The classical, interpretive justification of judicial review, put
forward in The Federalist 78 and Marbury v Madison, purports to resolve this difficulty. 20 On this view, courts are obligated to
interpret the higher law of We the People embodied in the Constitution and to preserve it against encroachment by the ordinary
law of officers of government embodied in legislation. Therefore, judicial review implies constitutional, not judicial, supremacy,
or the supremacy of the People over their agents, the officers of government.
In recent years, narrow originalists like Robert Bork and Justice Antonin Scalia have claimed a monopoly on the classical,

interpretive justification of judicial review. 21 But Ackerman, *1521 through his theory of dualism, has sought to reclaim that
justification and to reconstruct it. 22 He has done so by arguing that higher lawmaking by We the People includes not only
amendments to the Constitution adopted through the formal procedures of Article V but also unconventional adaptation and
transformation of the Constitution outside Article V. He reconstructs the classical, interpretive justification in the sense that
judicial review under his theory is likewise justified as preserving the higher law of We the People (as he conceives it) against
encroachment by the ordinary law of officers of government.

It is important to note that a constitutional theory can be dualist in a general sense without being dualist in Ackerman's specific
sense. That is, a theory can insist upon maintaining the distinction between the constituent power of We the People and the
ordinary power of officers of government without endorsing his complex apparatus of higher lawmaking outside Article V. For
example, Ronald Dworkin's constitutional theory is dualist in this general sense and indeed Dworkin, like Ackerman, seeks
to reclaim and reconstruct the classical, interpretive justification of judicial review. 23 Dworkin does so by putting forward a
theory of constitutional interpretation--both a conception of What the Constitution is and a conception of How it should be
interpreted 24 --that is an alternative to that of the narrow originalists. As for What, he argues that the Constitution embodies
abstract moral principles, rather than enacting relatively concrete rules. As for How, he argues that interpreting and applying
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those principles requires fresh judgments of political theory, rather than historical research to discover relatively specific original
understanding or original meaning. He now calls this interpretive strategy the “moral reading” of the Constitution. 25

*1522 The basic shortcoming of Ackerman's attempt to reclaim the classical, interpretive justification of judicial review is
that, unlike Dworkin, he attempts to do so without advancing a theory of constitutional interpretation as an alternative to that
of the narrow originalists. To be sure, Ackerman develops an alternative conception of What the Constitution is-- it includes
not only higher law adopted through the formal amending procedures of Article V but also that ratified through unconventional
adaptations and transformations outside Article V. But he does not advance an alternative understanding of How the Constitution
should be interpreted. What Volume II, Transformations, provides is not a theory of interpretation--we must hope for that in
the projected Volume III, Interpretations--but a model of transformation whereby political figures and movements earn the
authority to speak in the name of We the People. In fact, Ackerman has not written anything in either Volume I or Volume II

about interpretation as a general theoretical matter. He promises to develop concrete interpretations in Volume III. 26 I return to
this matter below, in assessing Ackerman's claim that the “possibility of interpretation” depends upon our accepting his theory.
B. The Leveling of Ackerman's Dualism
In Transformations, Ackerman does not make good on the claim that his theory of dualist democracy reclaims or reconstructs
the classical, interpretive justification of judicial review. Instead, he develops that theory in a manner that may forfeit that
justification and along with it his claim to be a dualist. For in Transformations, he practically levels his dualism to a form of
monism (or perhaps super-monism).

As stated above, dualists in a general sense maintain a basic distinction between the higher law of We the People embodied
in the Constitution and the ordinary law of officers of government embodied in legislation. On first sight, it might seem that
almost every constitutional scholar in America is a dualist in this sense. Yet, to recall a term that Ackerman used in Discovering
the Constitution, before he coined the term “monism,” some constitutional scholars in effect “level” the higher law to the level
of ordinary law. 27 There are several ways that they do this. One approach is *1523 to propose that judicial review should be
extremely deferential to legislatures and executives, indeed so deferential that it levels the Constitution in the sense that for all
practical purposes it does not limit legislation. James Bradley Thayer and Justice Felix Frankfurter are such levelers. 28 Another
way to level the higher law is to argue that it is exclusively or overwhelmingly concerned with securing procedural rights that
are preconditions for the legitimacy of ordinary law as opposed to securing substantive rights that limit what government may
do through ordinary law. Ackerman characterizes John Hart Ely as such a leveler. 29

A third way to level the higher law of the Constitution is to suggest that higher lawmaking is not as fundamentally different from
ordinary lawmaking as it initially appeared to be (when we characterized dualism as distinguishing two tracks of lawmaking).
Ackerman proves to be a leveler in this sense. He does not make the general dualist argument that there are two distinct tracks of
lawmaking--higher lawmaking through the procedures prescribed in Article V and ordinary lawmaking through the procedures
prescribed in Article I. Instead, he makes the argument that we have two routes of higher lawmaking--one through following
the procedures of Article V and another through engaging in political activity that proceeds through the five stages of his model
of transformation. The latter route looks like an intermediate track of lawmaking, perhaps super-ordinary lawmaking through
sustained, deep, and broad success in the electoral and legislative processes; hence my suggestion that Ackerman “levels” his
dualism to a form of super-monism. 30

*1524 The driving force behind Ackerman's leveling of dualism is his notion of popular sovereignty, which bridles at Article
V's pretensions to rein it in. This point is nowhere more clear than in Ackerman's claim that, to realize the possibility of popular
sovereignty, we must move beyond theories that stringently maintain the distinction between the two tracks of lawmaking
to embrace a theory that acknowledges the unruly, unconventional ways in which the forces of popular sovereignty have
transformed our higher law along with our higher lawmaking system. I take up this claim below.
Furthermore, Ackerman's theory of transformations practically levels popular sovereignty from constituent power to ordinary
power (albeit ordinary power exercised in extraordinary circumstances or moments). The notion of popular sovereignty is
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notoriously ambiguous, mysterious, and vague, 31 although it is not always acknowledged to be so in constitutional theory.
Monists and dualists have very different conceptions of the notion of popular sovereignty. As conceived by monists, it refers
basically to parliamentary supremacy on a British model, and it amounts to the ordinary power of officers of government engaged
in passing the ordinary law of legislation in a majoritarian representative democracy. But popular sovereignty as conceived
by dualists refers in the first instance to the constituent power engaged in deliberating about and adopting the higher law of
the Constitution. 32

When Ackerman initially sketches the foundations of dualist democracy, he seems to contemplate popular sovereignty in the
latter sense. But by the time he elaborates upon the transformation to the New Deal, at the behest of popular sovereignty
outside Article V, he seems practically to contemplate popular sovereignty *1525 in the former sense. Admittedly, the popular
sovereignty that he envisions is more sustained, deeper, and broader than that of the monist notion of popular sovereignty
as parliamentary supremacy or majoritarian representative democracy. And it is popular sovereignty that expresses itself in
extraordinary moments. But it is popular sovereignty that can exert itself unconventionally through elections rather than ratifying
bodies, and through statutes and even judicial opinions rather than formal amendments. Therein lies the proof that Ackerman
has leveled dualism. Indeed, for Ackerman, the People can even purport formally to amend the Constitution through a statute (pp
414-16). 33 As compared with Ackerman, dualists who more rigorously maintain the distinction between higher lawmaking and
ordinary lawmaking, along with that between constituent power and ordinary power, may have a superior claim to be dualists
and may be in a better position to reclaim and reconstruct the classical, interpretive justification of judicial review.
C. From Positivism Without Law to Judicial Lawmaking Through Transformative Judicial Opinions
That is not all. Ackerman also may forfeit his claim to be invoking the classical, interpretive justification of judicial review.
Again, dualists resolve the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” by arguing that judicial review interpreting and preserving the
higher law of the Constitution against encroachment by the ordinary law of legislation entails constitutional, not judicial,
supremacy. Some critics of Foundations argued that Ackerman's dualism, and in particular his theory that the New Deal was a

constitutional amendment, was an ironic instance of “legal positivism without positive law.” 34 That is, Ackerman claimed to
be *1526 developing a positivist theory that could establish that the New Deal was a constitutional amendment, but his theory
did not provide any higher law--a constitutional text or text-analogue--that constituted the amendment and that therefore could
be interpreted and preserved against encroachment by ordinary law.
In Transformations, Ackerman puts forward the idea of “transformative judicial opinions” to fill in the content of the New
Deal amendment (pp 26, 359-77). These opinions, written mostly between 1937 and 1942 by FDR's new appointees to the
Supreme Court--the “transformative judicial appointees”--gave content to the New Deal transformation's general commitment
to activist government in the regulatory and welfare state (or, more properly, established the constitutional permissibility of such
government). They rendered the considered political judgments of We the People, or popular sovereignty, expressed through
the electoral and political processes, into the vernacular of constitutional law. And in Ackerman's theory, these transformative
judicial opinions supplied the deficiency of positivism without law, for they provided the law--the text-analogue--needed to
specify the New Deal amendment to the Constitution. These opinions, as Ackerman puts it, are “the functional equivalent of
formal constitutional amendments” (pp 26, 361).
Not so fast. This move may be available to some constitutional scholars, such as realists who believe that courts to some extent
operate as a continually sitting constitutional convention. But it would seem not to be available to Ackerman, so long as he
claims to be reclaiming or reconstructing the classical, interpretive justification of judicial review. For this move all but concedes
that when judges engage in judicial review during constitutional moments, they are literally making, rather than interpreting, the
higher law ordained and established by the Constitution. Constitutional scholars who are haunted by the “counter-majoritarian
difficulty” dread the nightmare of judges functioning as the equivalent of a continually sitting constitutional convention. 35 The
classical, interpretive justification's response to the charge of judicial supremacy with the claim of constitutional supremacy-that it is not the judges, but the Constitution in the name of We the People, who did it--can allay that dread only if in principle
the content of the Constitution is something other than judicial *1527 opinions. By advancing the notion that transformative
judicial opinions provide the content of the higher law of the Constitution, Ackerman aggravates rather than allays that dread.

© 2022 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

6

WE THE UNCONVENTIONAL AMERICAN PEOPLE, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1513

Ackerman no doubt would respond that the justices issuing transformative judicial opinions did so in the name of the higher
law of the Constitution, as established through the New Deal amendment, which itself was ratified by We the People through
the five-stage model of transformation. Thus, the justices spoke in those opinions in the name of the People after all, and they
can put on the mantle of constitutional supremacy as distinguished from judicial supremacy. But this response loses plausibility
when justices are interpreting election returns and political mandates, and writing a constitutional text-analogue to codify them,
rather than interpreting a text given to them (even if the text has an unconventional pedigree, as on Ackerman's account the
Fourteenth Amendment does (pp 99-119)). For justices have no special competence in interpreting election returns and political
mandates, and in any event such political phenomena are unavoidably majoritarian.
D. The Thinness of Ackerman's Dualism
Our constitutional scheme is dualist not only in the general sense just analyzed but also in the substantive sense that it is a
synthesis of the conflicting traditions of civic republicanism and liberalism. This conflict is encapsulated in Benjamin Constant's
famous contrast between the tradition associated with Jean-Jacques Rousseau, which gives primacy to the liberties of the
ancients, such as the equal political liberties and the values of public life, and the tradition associated with John Locke, which
gives greater weight to the liberties of the moderns, such as liberty of conscience, certain basic rights of the person and of

property, and the rule of law. 36 Many constitutional theorists, including Ackerman, have offered their theories as syntheses of
these two traditions. I have suggested elsewhere that certain liberals have co-opted the revival of the republican tradition by
constructing syntheses that have yielded thinner accounts of republicanism than one might have expected and than republicans
might have hoped *1528 for. 37 Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein are the most obvious cases in point. 38 But Ackerman too

is a liberal who has gotten on this bandwagon, calling his theory a “liberal republicanism,” 39 and his synthesis is thinner still.
For one thing, Ackerman's version of a liberal republicanism is more a “cycle” or rotation between liberalism and republicanism
than a synthesis of them. During periods of ordinary politics, we have liberalism (as Ackerman puts it, we are private citizens),
and during moments of constitutional politics and periods of transformation, we turn to republicanism (as he puts it, we are

private citizens), 40 rather than having a synthesis of liberalism and republicanism both in ordinary politics and in constitutional
politics. For another, the liberalism in play in Ackerman's dualism is quite thin. It is basically liberalism as conceived by interest-

group pluralists like Robert Dahl 41 rather than liberalism as conceived by liberal republicans or deliberative democrats like
Michelman and Sunstein. Unlike the latter theorists, Ackerman does not advance a conception of deliberative democracy that
requires government to provide public-regarding reasons concerning the common good for its actions, even in ordinary politics,
and that forbids government from acting solely on the basis of the self-interested preferences of well-organized private groups
or individuals. What is more, the republicanism in play in his theory is also quite thin. He seems to conceive republican selfgovernment entirely in terms of deliberation about the content of the higher law rather than in terms of deliberation about the
common good in adopting ordinary law. 42

A richer and better synthesis of these competing traditions--or substantive dualism--would conceive both ordinary politics and
the content of the higher law of the Constitution as syntheses *1529 of liberalism and republicanism. Elsewhere, I have argued
for a constitutional theory within which both ordinary politics and constitutional politics are such syntheses. It combines a
“republican” theme of securing the basic liberties that are preconditions for deliberative democracy (or the liberties of the
ancients), with a “liberal” theme of securing the basic liberties that are preconditions for deliberative autonomy (or the liberties
of the moderns). 43 Such a theory provides the basis for a richer form of dualism than Ackerman's.
III. The Possibility of Popular Sovereignty
Is Article V of the Constitution a fixed point--or foundational text-- that any constitutional theory, including those grounded in
popular sovereignty, must be able acceptably to fit and justify? Or is Article V a pox upon the Constitution that any theory of
popular sovereignty worthy of invoking the name We the People should seek to limit and contain, if possible, by supplementing

or even overriding it? 44 Is it possible to articulate a constitutional theory that gives due regard to popular sovereignty but that
also takes Article V seriously as prescribing the exclusive procedures for amending the Constitution?
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Ackerman contends that “the possibility of popular sovereignty” under our Constitution depends upon our accepting his theory
of unconventional adaptation and transformation outside Article V (p 119). 45 What does he mean by this claim? He seems to
be making both a justificatory claim and a hortatory claim. The justificatory claim is that our Constitution--notwithstanding the
text of Article V in the Constitution itself--presupposes a theory of popular sovereignty in light of which Article V is incomplete,
a compromise, or even a mistake (if it purports to prescribe the exclusive procedures for making higher law). Therefore, in
order for the Constitution to be able to realize its commitment to popular sovereignty, and indeed for it to be legitimate, We
the People must be free to amend and transform it outside the formal procedures of Article V, including through the model of
transformation that Ackerman develops. Otherwise, we are not a properly self-governing People.

*1530 The hortatory claim is that We the People are more likely to live up to the rights and responsibilities of self-government
if we believe that the People, as recently as the New Deal, rose to the occasion of transforming the higher law of the Constitution.
After all, if We the People have done so only once (or perhaps twice) in American history, and not since the Founding (or
possibly Reconstruction) at that, what is the hope of the People accomplishing anything great by way of higher lawmaking in
our time? Other theories, including those of Article V exclusivity, denigrate the constitutional creativity of We the People, and
thus may demoralize or debilitate the People, undermining the possibility of popular sovereignty.
To these claims, I offer three responses. First, through advancing the idea that “the possibility of popular sovereignty” requires us
to supplement or even override Article V, Ackerman proves in Transformations to be a popular sovereignty-perfecting theorist.
That is, he is arguing that the Constitution presupposes a theory of popular sovereignty in light of which Article V-- evidently
a fixed point or foundational text--can be seen to be incomplete, a compromise, or even a mistake. And he is arguing for
interpreting the Constitution so as to perfect it from the standpoint of his theory of popular sovereignty, even to the point of
supplementing or overriding provisions of its text. In terms of Dworkin's well-known formulations, Ackerman is calling for
interpreting the Constitution so as to make it the best it can be and putting forward a “moral reading” of the Constitution. 46

To suggest that Ackerman's theory, notwithstanding his strenuous and strained efforts in Foundations to differentiate it from
theories like Dworkin's, 47 reflects a moral reading of the Constitution is certainly not to say that it is wrong or incoherent.

Indeed, elsewhere I have advanced what I call a “Constitution-perfecting theory,” 48 which reflects a moral reading. Rather, it
is *1531 to suggest that Ackerman's own development of his theory shows that we should assess it on different grounds than

he initially offered it. Applying Dworkin's distinction between two dimensions of best interpretation, fit and justification, 49 he

had asserted that “fit is everything” 50 and thus had implied that there was no need to resort to the dimension of justification in
deciding which of the available competing theories provides the best account of our constitutional scheme. He had submitted
that only his theory of dualist democracy and popular sovereignty--as against theories like Dworkin's--could fit the text of

the Constitution and our constitutional experience. 51 Admittedly, Ackerman would respond that his theory provides the best
interpretation of our constitutional scheme--as a matter of justification as well as fit--but to sustain that claim he would need to
offer a fuller justification for dualist democracy and popular sovereignty than he has provided thus far.

Second, Ackerman does not show the impossibility of--or give sufficient attention to the possibility of--a constitutional theory
that both gives due regard to the claims of popular sovereignty and takes Article V seriously as a fixed point of the Constitution
that any constitutional theory must be able acceptably to fit and justify. Here, I sketch a dualist constitutional theory that does
so. The claims of popular sovereignty certainly have a place, and carry great weight, in constitutional theory, but not the place or
the weight that Ackerman gives them. Our Constitution's commitment to popular sovereignty is not incompatible with Article
V exclusivity. Our constitutional scheme is dualist in a general sense--it prescribes distinct tracks for higher lawmaking and for
ordinary lawmaking--and our commitment to popular sovereignty is expressed through and limited by Article V's procedures for
higher lawmaking. On this view, We the People ordained and established the Constitution, and from time to time have amended
it, and thus the Constitution manifests popular sovereignty. But the Constitution also constitutes a scheme of government and a
charter of principles that seek to establish justice and to express the fundamental commitments and highest *1532 aspirations

of a people. 52 Once a workable Constitution of principle is in place, living under it, and interpreting it with integrity so as
to make it the best it can be, carry their own imperatives. We should interpret the Constitution, both inside and outside the
courts, so as to secure the basic liberties that are the preconditions for the legitimacy and trustworthiness of political decisions
in our constitutional democracy. In justifying interpretations of it, we need not always make recourse to the fount of popular
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sovereignty. For our Constitution expresses commitments and aspirations besides popular sovereignty, and it may be legitimate
and trustworthy for reasons other than conformity to popular sovereignty.
Ackerman is in the grip of an assumption or premise that the fundamental value or point of our Constitution and our democracy

is a commitment to popular sovereignty. 53 This premise undergirds a popular sovereignty conception of democracy that is
not true to our scheme of government and that indeed obscures the true character and importance of our system. Instead, our
Constitution reflects and presupposes a constitutional conception of democracy (or constitutional democracy) that conceives the
fundamental point or value of our democracy to be concern for securing for everyone the status of free and equal citizenship. 54
Within such a dualist constitutional democracy, securing the preconditions for self-government requires not merely preserving
the possibility of popular sovereignty. It requires securing the basic liberties that are preconditions for self-government in two
senses: not only deliberative democracy but also deliberative autonomy. 55

*1533 From the standpoint of a dualist theory of constitutional democracy, it would be inapt to criticize Article V (or the
Constitution generally) for its failure to conform to a deeper, richer, or more thoroughgoing commitment to popular sovereignty.
Only a leveler who was in the grip of a different theory of popular sovereignty than that which the Constitution reflects and
presupposes would make such a criticism. A dualist who understood the character of the higher law of our Constitution and
the commitments of our constitutional democracy would not reduce our constitutional scheme into a manifestation of popular
sovereignty, or transform it in the image of popular sovereignty.
In support of Article V exclusivity in such a dualist scheme, I would say two things. For one thing, I would give two
cheers for Article V in a defensive sense, for it has protected the Constitution and its citizens against the recent rash of

“amendmentitis.” 56 Numerous illiberal and ill-conceived amendments that would erode basic liberties or limit important
powers have been introduced in Congress in recent years: the Flag Burning Amendment, the Balanced Budget Amendment, the
Parental Rights Amendment, the Religious Freedom Amendment, and the Human Life Amendment, to name a few. Despite the
claims of representatives and senators in Congress to have a mandate from the People, all of the measures that have come up for
a vote have failed to secure the two-thirds vote of both houses required by Article V to propose an amendment for ratification
by the states. Article V's requirements have protected the Constitution and its citizens from such measures. 57

For another, there is much to be said for Article V in an affirmative sense. As Lawrence Sager has cogently argued, the
obduracy of Article V to ready and easy amendment of the Constitution has encouraged and fostered broad interpretation of the

Constitution's rights-protecting and power-conferring provisions. 58 It *1534 has underscored the character of the Constitution
as a charter of majestic generalities and abstract principles as opposed to a code of relatively specific original understandings.
Thus, Article V has underwritten approaches to constitutional interpretation like those of Dworkin's moral reading, Sager's
justice-seeking constitutionalism, and my own Constitution-perfecting theory. And such approaches to interpretation are
appropriate in a dualist scheme of constitutional democracy of the sort sketched above. Unfortunately, Ackerman does not

seriously engage such arguments. 59 Worse yet, his theory of amendment and transformation seems to presuppose a remarkably

(and uncharacteristically 60 ) narrow view of interpretation: that interpretation does not countenance change, and therefore that
change may occur only through amendment. I return to this issue below.
Third, Ackerman's theory of popular sovereignty and transformation meets with difficulty in fitting and justifying our dualist
constitutional scheme. Our constitutional order cannot be reduced to a scheme of popular sovereignty, nor can our basic liberties
(and leading cases interpreting them since 1937) be reduced to the structure of the modern republic brought about by the
transformation to New Deal Democracy.
Ackerman's popular sovereignty-perfecting approach to interpreting the Constitution bears a family resemblance to

representation-reinforcing or process-perfecting theories such as those of Ely and Sunstein. 61 Elsewhere, I have criticized the
architecture of the latter theories, which attempt to frame or recast all of our basic liberties, both substantive and procedural,

as preconditions *1535 for representative or deliberative democracy. 62 I have argued instead for a Constitution-perfecting
theory with two fundamental themes, which would reinforce not only the procedural liberties (those associated with deliberative
democracy), but also the substantive liberties (those related to deliberative autonomy) embodied in our Constitution.
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My critique of the architecture of theories like Ely's and Sunstein's applies with some force to the architecture of Ackerman's
theory, which reduces our Constitution to a manifestation of popular sovereignty, and recasts its provisions so as to secure the
preconditions for popular sovereignty. For example, whereas Ely and Sunstein reject the substantive liberties like privacy or

autonomy at issue in cases like Griswold v Connecticut 63 and Roe v Wade, 64 or recast them in procedural terms, Ackerman
attempts to justify such liberties and cases in terms of We the People's transformation of the Constitution through the New

Deal. 65 In particular, I would emphasize two reasons for the superiority of a Constitution-perfecting theory with the foregoing
two themes. The first reason is architectonic: presenting our basic liberties in terms of deliberative democracy and deliberative
autonomy illustrates that these two fundamental themes are co-original and of equal weight, and that neither is foundational. 66
For both themes derive from a common substrate: a conception of citizens as free and equal persons (with two moral powers
corresponding to the two themes) and a conception of society as a fair system of social cooperation. Both themes are constitutive
of and articulate preconditions for the legitimacy and trustworthiness of political decisions in our constitutional democracy.
Our Constitution resists being reduced to an expression of popular sovereignty, just as it resists being recast into the mold of
representative or deliberative democracy.
The second reason is elegance: the importance of being elegant (though not too reductive) in constructing a constitutional
theory. Ackerman's theory, ironically, is not only reductive in the way just discussed but also inelegant. By his own self-

deprecating characterization, it may appear to be an “unworkable Rube Goldberg contraption.” 67 To be sure, our constitutional
scheme is complex, *1536 and may require complex theories to account for it. But a Constitution-perfecting theory, with
the two fundamental themes of deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy, can more elegantly, straightforwardly, and
plausibly account for our dualist constitutional scheme than can Ackerman's theory. Furthermore, the fact that the apparatus
of Ackerman's theory is quite unwieldy is troublesome given his hortatory claims for it. It may be more effective to advance
a hortatory constitutionalism that can appeal directly to our aspirational principles of liberty, equality, and justice in addition
to democracy, rather than to deploy a framework that may garble the exhortations because it always has to reconceive them in
terms of the touchstone of popular sovereignty. Because Dworkin's moral reading of the Constitution, Sager's justice-seeking
constitutionalism, and my own Constitution-perfecting theory can appeal directly to such aspirational principles, they may be
more effective in supporting a comprehensible hortatory constitutionalism than is Ackerman's theory.
Finally, our basic liberties (and leading cases interpreting them since 1937) cannot be reduced to a manifestation of popular
sovereignty or justified in terms of the structure of the modern New Deal republic. We might concede to Ackerman that the
New Deal was the last fundamental transformation of the Constitution (in a general sense, not in Ackerman's specific sense
of amending the Constitution) and also grant that he is right that the purported Reagan Revolution failed to bring about a
transformation (pp 389-403), yet still be unable to justify much of contemporary constitutional law in terms of the transformation
to New Deal Democracy and the fundamental commitments of the modern New Deal republic. (I return to this point in assessing
Ackerman's claim about “the possibility of interpretation.”) This is not to say that we do not need an account of the political
transformation wrought by the New Deal to get us to where we are today. Rather, it is to say that we need more than the
New Deal transformation to do so. We need a theoretical structure that will go beyond that transformation and beyond popular
sovereignty to provide a substantive account of our scheme of basic liberties. In short, we need a dualist constitutional theory
of the sort I have sketched.
IV. The Possibility of Interpretation
Ackerman also suggests that to preserve or realize “the possibility of interpretation” of our Constitution--as opposed to a realist
vision of judicial lawmaking--we must accept his theory of *1537 amendment and transformation outside Article V. He stated

this claim in Foundations, 68 alludes to it in Transformations (p 419), and promises to elaborate upon it in Interpretations. 69
But the claim should be assessed here, because it exposes a fundamental shortcoming in Ackerman's theory: He does not put
forward a theory of interpretation!
I daresay that Ackerman's failure to develop a theory of interpretation may help to explain why he develops a theory of
amendment outside Article V. That is, if Ackerman had a broad conception of interpretation, he would not need such a theory
of amendment. Along similar lines, some critics have suggested that Ackerman's project reflects a remarkably narrow view
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of interpretation: 70 that interpretation does not countenance change; therefore, change may occur only through amendment;
hence, for the Constitution to be interpretable after the change brought about during the New Deal, it must have been amended
through the New Deal.
Furthermore, despite Ackerman's claim about “the possibility of interpretation,” it is impossible, plausibly and elegantly, to
justify our basic liberties and many of the leading constitutional law decisions since 1937 in terms of popular sovereignty and
the New Deal transformation. In fact, the cases that Ackerman analyzes in Foundations in connection with “the possibility of
interpretation” 71 --Brown v Board of Education and Griswold v Connecticut--are difficult to justify in these terms. It is more
straightforward to justify those decisions in terms of equal citizenship and privacy than in terms of the transformation to the
activist regulatory and welfare state. The point is not simply that those cases--and many others that follow, including Planned

Parenthood v Casey 72 --seem far afield from the transformation to the New Deal, but also that the accounts Ackerman offers
of them are far less elegant and apt than other available accounts.

*1538 Ackerman presumably will say more about interpretation, if not put forward a theory of interpretation, in the projected
Volume III, Interpretations. Here I want to suggest that Ackerman's presuppositions about interpretation in Transformations
may pose or aggravate difficulties for his development of a theory of interpretation and advancement of concrete interpretations
in Interpretations. For Volume II's model of transformations-- and the underlying conception of three republics constituted
by the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal--emphasizes the discontinuity between each republic, and presumably
the discontinuity between the substance of the higher law of the Constitution for each republic. Yet in Volume III, Ackerman
will quest for fidelity as “intergenerational synthesis,” 73 or synthesis across generations or republics, notwithstanding the

discontinuity that he himself has emphasized. (Ackerman is sometimes viewed as a “broad originalist,” 74 and so presumably
the notion of intergenerational synthesis will have a broad originalist cast to it.) Thus, Ackerman's account of transformations,
to the extent that it overstates discontinuity, may make it more difficult for him credibly to develop interpretations that achieve
such synthesis than if he had a theory of interpretation that could acknowledge change without casting it as amendment or
transformation.
Ackerman criticizes constitutional theories that, instead of seeing the New Deal as an amendment or transformation, cloak
its creativity in the “myth of rediscovery”--the myth that the Supreme Court in 1937 and afterward rediscovered the original
understanding of the Constitution as contemplated by the Founding Federalists (pp 10, 259, 279). And he presents such myths
as efforts to deny constitutional creativity. Yet Ackerman overlooks the fact that what generate myths of rediscovery are theories
of originalism, including broad originalist theories like his own. For originalists, both narrow and broad, believe that the only
way to be faithful to the Constitution is to follow or translate original *1539 meaning or original understanding, 75 and to
that extent to deny creativity in interpreting it.

As long as Ackerman conceives interpretation in terms of some form of broad originalism, he is likely, when he attempts to
develop interpretations that attain intergenerational syntheses, to provide some of his own myths of rediscovery. The proof of
this suggestion lies in the fact that some of Ackerman's acolytes, notably Lawrence Lessig, have been driven by their quests for
forms of broad originalism to develop accounts of fidelity as translation, as opposed to accounts of constitutional transformation:
Lessig's account of the New Deal deradicalizes Ackerman's account of the creativity of transformation in favor of a quest for

fidelity in translation of original meaning, which amounts to a sophisticated myth of rediscovery. 76 The best way to avoid the
tendency to propagate myths of rediscovery is to eschew originalism, both narrow and broad, in favor of a theory of interpretation
that conceives fidelity to the Constitution as integrity with the moral reading of the Constitution. Such a theory can acknowledge
change in interpretation without needing to dress it up in the garb of translations of original meaning or transformations of
popular sovereignty.
Conclusion: The Constitution Goes to Yale
In concluding, I return to the puzzle that I posed in the introduction: How is it possible that Ackerman could believe it necessary
to develop his theory of constitutional amendment and transformation outside Article V in order to realize “the possibility of
popular sovereignty” and “the possibility of interpretation”? The difficulties with Ackerman's dualism-- which underlie the
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problems with these two claims--are difficulties in his conceptions of democracy and interpretation, respectively. The root
difficulties in Ackerman's conceptions bear deep affinities to those in the ideas of his former Yale colleague, Bickel (not to
mention those in the work of his current Yale colleague, Amar 77 ).

*1540 In recent years, some constitutional scholars have noted the emergence of a “Yale school” of constitutional theory,

by which they refer to Ackerman's and Amar's theories of amending the Constitution outside Article V. 78 But these theories
are simply the latest symptom or manifestation of deeper difficulties in conceptions of democracy and interpretation that have
plagued Yale constitutional theorists since Bickel. By the formulation “the Constitution goes to Yale,” I mean to suggest that
Yale seems to foster or generate constitutional theories that are haunted or hobbled by the root difficulties of Bickel's theory,
which were reflected in his formulation of and response to the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.” The first difficulty was that
Bickel held an impoverished conception of democracy as majoritarian representative democracy, within which not only judicial

review but even fundamental rights were deviant and anomalous rather than integral. 79 The second was that Bickel held an
impoverished conception of interpretation. He rejected the classical, interpretive justification of judicial review, and sought to

develop a “noninterpretive” justification grounded in preserving fundamental values. 80 Yet he proved incapable of articulating
a post-realist conception of interpretation that could withstand skeptical and democratic objections to every conceivable source

of fundamental values. 81 Thus, his quest for a source of fundamental values--which Ely aptly called the “odyssey of Alexander

Bickel”--became a nightmarish free-fall. 82

*1541 Ackerman began Discovering the Constitution--which launched the We the People project in 1984--by claiming that
he would “rediscover the Constitution” and dissolve the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” that haunted Bickel by reclaiming or

reconstructing the classical, interpretive justification of judicial review. 83 That certainly was a promising beginning. And one
might well have believed that Ackerman had the tools to rescue constitutional theory from the difficulties in, and brought on by,
Bickel's work. For one thing, Ackerman's understanding of democracy as dualist is richer than Bickel's. For another, Ackerman's
understanding of interpretation as “constructive” is more sophisticated than Bickel's, and it is staunchly post-realist. 84 All in
all, Ackerman is far more sophisticated than Bickel in what the latter called “the method of reason familiar to the discourse
of moral philosophy.” 85

But Ackerman is hobbled by the quest for “the possibility of popular sovereignty,” just as Bickel was haunted by the “countermajoritarian difficulty.” Accordingly, Ackerman develops a theory of democracy that reduces or recasts our Constitution and
constitutional democracy into the mold of popular sovereignty, just as Bickel rejected as deviant any feature of our constitutional
scheme that did not conform to a theory of majoritarian representative democracy. (Amar is either the synthetic culmination or
the reductio ad absurdum of the Yale school, for he fundamentally conceives popular sovereignty as majoritarian representative
democracy.) And Ackerman pursues “the possibility of interpretation,” whereas Bickel searched for a “noninterpretive”
justification of judicial review. This leads Ackerman to develop a pluralist conception of the sources of higher lawmaking
outside Article V, just as Bickel searched for a source of fundamental values outside the Constitution altogether.
As against Ackerman's and Bickel's theories, we need a conception of constitutional democracy of the sort I sketched here to
avoid the theoretical hankering to transform our “incorrigible,” “irreducible” dualist Constitution into the molds of popular
sovereignty and majoritarianism. And we need a conception of interpretation *1542 like Dworkin's to reclaim the dualist
justification of judicial review from Ackerman's reconstruction of it and to rescue the fundamental rights justification of judicial
review from Bickel's “noninterpretive” defense of it. Such conceptions offer hope of preserving and realizing our exceptional,
unconventional Constitution.
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Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan L Rev 395 (1995); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in
Translation, 71 Tex L Rev 1165 (1993). Ackerman criticizes Lessig's “legalist” account of the New Deal--which
addresses the question in terms of translation rather than transformation--for playing into the “reigning professional
narrative,” part of which is the “myth of rediscovery” (pp 290, 477 n 26).

77

Both Ackerman and Amar attempt either to dissolve or to resolve the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” through offering
theories of democracy grounded in popular sovereignty whereby We the People may amend the Constitution outside
Article V. In different ways, both Ackerman and Amar level the Constitution and along with it the idea of popular
sovereignty. Ackerman's conception of popular sovereignty leads him to supplement Article V with sustained supermonism, whereby We the People must be free to amend the Constitution through sustained popular movements. Amar
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